Participatory engineering: promises and pitfalls by Zittel, Thomas
www.ssoar.info
Participatory engineering: promises and pitfalls
Zittel, Thomas
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Sammelwerksbeitrag / collection article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Zittel, T. (2008). Participatory engineering: promises and pitfalls. In B. Kohler-Koch, D. d. Bièvre, & W. Maloney
(Eds.), Opening EU-governance to civil society: gains and challenges (pp. 119-144). Mannheim: Universität
Mannheim, Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES). https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-195407
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Chapter 6 
Participatory Engineering: 
Promises and Pitfalls 
 
Thomas Zittel 
Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich and University of Mannheim 
 
 
The perceived crisis of national systems of 
democracy 
Political elites in many established democracies perceive their system of 
government to be in a state of crisis. This concern is voiced in various ways 
across European democracies. The spectrum ranges from individual public 
statements to large scale government sponsored inquiries on the state of 
democracy, particularly in Scandinavian countries such as Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden.1 This rhetoric is driven by the all encompassing assumption that 
downward trends in established forms of political participation indicate that 
citizens are turning their backs on democracy and that this system of 
government is in a state of crisis.2 
                                                 
1 For an overview and further references see a listing at the OECD-website under 
http://www.oecd.org/document/42/0,2340,en_2649_33707_33617194_1_1_1_1,00.html, 
accessed January 2008. 
2 This paper does not aim to discuss actual trends in political participation. It takes the 
perception and rhetoric of political elites at face value and as a vantage point for its argument. 
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The rhetoric of crisis is met in many established democracies by actual policy 
initiatives aimed at finding solutions to stop the downturn of political 
participation. These initiatives can be understood in systematic ways through 
the concept of participatory engineering (Zittel and Fuchs 2007). The 
concept of participatory engineering indicates the purposive attempt of political 
elites to positively affect the level of political participation by increasing institutional 
opportunities to participate. It can be defined through three characteristic 
features. It is, firstly, goal directed and purposive. Institutional change can be 
a by-product of any form of policy change. In the context of participatory 
engineering, the enactment of new opportunities to participate serves as a 
policy goal in itself. A second characteristic feature of participatory 
engineering is its focus on institutional change. Democratic reform can take 
the form of pilot studies or experiments at an early stage in the process of 
political change. But such activities eventually imply the enactment of 
broader and more fundamental changes at the institutional level. A third 
characteristic feature of participatory engineering is its top-down politics. 
While moves towards democratic reform are intuitively associated with 
bottom-up developments and social movements, participatory engineering 
can be understood as a development primarily rooted in elite politics. 
 
The possible promises and pitfalls of participatory engineering concern two 
different levels of analysis. The behavioral effects of participatory engineering 
are one possible area of concern. Theories of participatory democracy 
emphasize the promises in this respect. Authors such as Carole Pateman 
                                                                                                                   
Obviously, students of political participation unveil a more complex situation when it comes 
to trends in political participation. They argue, for example, that downward trends in electoral 
participation are far from dramatic if perceived in the long run (Franklin 2002) that the 
evidence across multiple types of political participation is mixed (Klingemann and Fuchs 1995) 
and that many downward trends in the area of traditional forms of participation are offset by 
new forms of political engagement (Skocpol 1999). However, one can hardly disagree with the 
argument that traditional forms of participation have decreased to significant degrees during the 
past decades (Stolle and Hooghe 2004) and that public opinion does signal dissatisfaction and 
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(1970) suggest that participatory engineering could be an effective means to 
revitalize political engagement and to bring citizens back in (Zittel 2007). But 
theories of political participation provide a serious note of caution in this 
regard and rather emphasize the possible pitfalls. Verba and Nie (1972) 
stressed in this context the socio-economic basis of political participation and, 
thus, the fact that institutional structures are of little relevance in explaining 
the level of participation. Jan van Deth (2000) furthermore emphasizes that 
individuals are only moderately interested in participation due to their busy 
schedules and other priorities they might have in their lives. 
 
If we subscribe to the sceptics’ view on the behavioral effects of participatory 
institutions, the pitfalls of participatory engineering are quite obvious. 
Increasing the institutional opportunities to participate would firstly raise a 
standard which cannot be met at the individual level and which would serve 
as a source of further frustration with regard to politics. Even more 
important, we would secondly increase inequality because we would provide 
the already active ones with new ammunition to foster their own political 
interests while leaving the inactive ones empty handed and even further 
behind. 
 
This paper focuses on a second area of concern when it comes to debating 
the promises and pitfalls of participatory engineering. It asks about the impact 
of participatory engineering on the quality of democracy. The concept of 
democratic quality stresses the relationship between the normative core of democracy 
and its institutional manifestations. A high quality of democracy presupposes a 
perfect fit between the normative core values of democracy and the 
institutional structures of democracy. This paper asks about the promises and 
pitfalls of participatory engineering at this second level of analysis. It asks 
 
frustration with democratic governments (Pharr and Putnam 2000). The current perception 
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whether democratic reform is able to foster the fit between the normative 
and the institutional level of democracy and what kinds of strategies are able 
to do so.  
 
The paper addresses its core question in three steps. In a first step, it aims to 
develop a heuristic frame for the evaluation of strategies of participatory 
engineering by focusing on the concept of the quality of democracy and the 
role of participation in this debate. This aim implies the following three 
questions: 1) What are the core values of democracy? 2) Which institutional 
structures are considered effective in implementing these goals? 3) Which 
strategy of participatory engineering is able to bring existing institutions closer 
to the given normative frame? I will, secondly, provide cursory case specific 
evidence on the direction of democratic reform in selected European 
democracies. These case studies should be seen as a first attempt to pre-test 
the initial frame of research and to provide a preliminary empirical answer to 
the research question. Thirdly, I will close with a conclusion and some 
remarks regarding further research questions that arise from my cursory 
empirical analysis. 
Participatory engineering in Polyarchies: more 
pitfalls than promises 
Robert Dahl’s (1971) concept of Polyarchy provides a cornerstone for the 
debate on democratic quality. To be sure, Dahl does not use this concept 
himself. He is primarily concerned with the problem of distinguishing 
democracy from non-democracy and with identifying the prerequisites of 
democracy. His approach, however, not only provided the groundwork for 
the proceeding discussion on democratic quality in terms of methodology and 
research design, but also still represents a crucial reference point for the 
                                                                                                                   
among political elites is, thus, not without any empirical basis. 
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debate on democratic quality in terms of substance. Many endeavors to 
measure democratic quality draw from Dahl’s model while aiming at 
measuring democracy in more fine grained ways and improving Dahl’s 
original indicators for measurement (Kaiser und Seils 2005). The Polyarchy 
model is, thus, a useful and relevant framework to discuss the question raised 
above. 
 
Figure 1: Robert Dahl’s model of Polyarchy 
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According to Dahl, democracy is defined by two dimensions. As Figure 1 
suggests, the first dimension stresses public sovereignty as one of the two basic 
building blocks of democracy. This principle stresses the need for political 
decisions to be legitimized by the consent of those who are subject to these 
decisions. The second dimension of democracy emphasizes the need for the 
control of political power. This notion suggests that in democracies, power 
needs to be constantly subjected to critical review and questioning. In Dahl’s 
view, the best possible quality of democracy is achieved, when both core 
values of democracy are balanced at a moderate level through specific 
institutional structures. Which are these specific structures and how can we 
measure them? 
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Dahl operationalizes the notion of public sovereignty via an electoral regime 
defined and measured by three empirical indicators: 1) The election and re-
election of public officials; 2) The existence of regular elections; 3) The 
existence of inclusive voting rights. Dahl’s second basic dimension of 
democracy is operationalized via a pluralist regime. Dahl perceives the 
competition between political groups as the most effective means to 
implement the notion of the control of power without affecting the exercise 
of popular sovereignty in negative ways. This concept is specified and 
measured through the four following empirical indicators: 1) Freedom of 
speech; 2) Freedom of information; 3) Freedom of organization; 4) Inclusive 
citizenship. The configuration of these structures defines in Dahl’s view the 
highest possible quality of democracy, namely Polyarchy. 
 
In regard to our underlying question, Dahl’s model of liberal democracy 
carries one important argument that needs to be highlighted and discussed. It 
suggests that any form of participatory engineering, which goes beyond 
marginal forms of optimizing the existing structures of Polyarchy, produces 
significant risks for democratic government. This is, first and foremost, due to 
the very fact that Dahl’s measures produce little variance across established 
democracies: 1) Voting rights are widely distributed and highly inclusive; 2) 
Information rights as well as the freedoms of speech and organization are fully 
implemented in established democracies (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). Dahl 
secondly suggests that Polyarchy defines the best possible form of democracy 
and that any shift along the two core dimensions of democracy will put the 
quality of democracy at a balance. I will elaborate on these risks in the 
following two thought experiments drawing from models of democratic 
quality and traditional arguments in normative democratic theory. 
 
In a first thought experiment I am assuming a simultaneous shift along both 
dimensions of democracy in the direction of the upper right hand corner. 
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The resulting problems become most obvious when focusing on the most 
extreme point at the upper right hand corner, as depicted in figure 2. This 
point defines a situation in which sovereignty and the control of power are 
pushed to their limits. Under this condition, every member of the 
community would have the right to participate in the sanctioning of policies 
with an equal voice. This would presuppose implementing the value of 
popular sovereignty via a direct democratic regime which allows every 
member of the community to participate in every binding decision to be 
taken. Under this condition, decisions would, furthermore, have to be taken 
under strict consensus rule, in order to maximize the control of power. This 
means that every member of the community would have the right to reject a 
decision that he or she sees as an infringement of his or her rights. Such a 
system can be perceived as a hyperdemocratic regime. The exercise of 
authority is absent under such conditions, everything depends on the 
voluntary consent of every single member in the community. 
 
Figure 2: Hyperdemocracy 
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The risks of such a system of hyperdemocracy are obvious. First and 
foremost, it implies rising decision making costs and, thus, a threat to the 
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efficiency and problem solving capacity of democratic government. This 
would be especially true in a complex pluralist society which would be 
paralyzed under a hyperdemocratic system when it comes to the task of 
collective decision making and which would produce low output-legitimacy 
in Fritz Scharpf’s (1970) terms. Dahl is, however, more concerned with a 
quite different matter in his rejection of hyperdemocracy. The tension 
between input- and output legitimacy does not loom large in his theory. He 
believes that hyperdemocracy would favor the status quo, enabling tiny 
minorities to block any kind of innovation and to frustrate emerging new 
needs and desires (Dahl 1989: 153f.). Dahl remains true to his pluralist creed 
in his opposition to hyperdemocracy. 
 
A second thought experiment stipulates a one sided shift of the ideal point 
within Dahl’s model. The literature on democratic quality provides examples 
for the two possible directions this shift might take. Each one of these shifts 
also carries risks that I shall briefly sketch in the following. 
 
Figure 3: Guardianship democracy 
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One example of a slightly skewed conception of democratic quality is 
developed by students of democratic transformation. Authors, such as 
Guillermo O’Donnell et al. (2004), began to realize differences between their 
objects of study and established democracies, once the transformation process 
had come to an end. In an attempt to understand and measure these 
differences, they do stress Dahl’s two dimensions of democracy: popular 
sovereignty and the control of power. But their vision of democratic quality, 
nevertheless, results in a skewed shape towards the power-check dimension as 
figure 3 demonstrates. This skewed shape is due to the emphasis on a 
constitutional regime as one additional means to implement the value of 
power control. 
 
Wolfgang Merkel’s (2004) model of an embedded democracy reflects the 
constitutional and legalistic aspect of democracy entertained by 
transformation theorists. Merkel’s model highlights the ideal of an electoral 
system that is tightly embedded into a pluralist regime (freedom of 
information, organization and speech) and into a constitutional/legalistic 
regime at the same time. According to Merkel, the core indicator of legal 
checks on political power is, firstly, the existence of codified laws to ensure 
civil liberties and to prevent encroachments by the state. These negative 
rights of freedom, secondly, need to be implemented and secured by 
independent courts functioning as “custodians” of the legislature. Merkel 
classifies any system deviating from this ideal as a defective democracy. 
 
The perspective of transformation theorists disturbs Dahl’s ideal point of 
democracy in significant ways, raising problems for the exercise of popular 
sovereignty. Under these circumstances, courts might become too influential 
by restricting by definition the democratic process and the exercise of popular 
sovereignty. Legalistic frames might increase under these circumstances the 
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rigidity of the system and might paralyze the political game as defined in 
terms of the development of majorities in the course of public debates (Dahl 
1989: 52f.). 
 
The difference between the transformation literature and their definition of 
democratic quality on the one hand, and Dahl’s argument on the other, can 
be explained by the particular empirical problems raised in the process of 
democratic consolidation. Transformation theorists perceived the lack of legal 
guarantees of rights and due processes of law as the most striking difference 
between developing and established democracies. They, thus, saw it as the 
crucial element needed for a further increase in the quality of democracy 
within emerging democracies. The perspective of transformation theorists, 
furthermore, draws from a second source which can be found in the 
normative debate on democracy. In this debate, theorists of liberal 
democracy, such as Giovanni Sartori (1987) or Peter Graf Kielmansegg 
(1977), stress, in contrast to Dahl’s model, constitutional safeguards as a 
crucial prerequisite for legitimate democratic government. 
 
Some students of democratic quality spoil Dahl’s ideal by stressing the value 
of popular sovereignty. Michael Saward (1994), for example, perceives direct 
democracy as a crucial criterion for democratic quality and, thus, suggests 
going beyond the mere implementation of an electoral regime. He 
simultaneously stresses regulations and laws to ensure a fair administrative 
process, as well as the negative right to freedom of worship. But this falls 
short of a full fledged constitutional regime. Saward, thus, clearly suggests a 
one sided shift of Dahl’s definition of democratic quality to the upper part in 
our two dimensional space. 
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Figure 4: Populist democracy 
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Maximizing popular sovereignty via a regime of direct decision making bears 
risks for the horizontal dimension of democracy. This one-sided shift could 
endanger the pluralist process in democratic decision making. Institutions of 
direct democracy leave less room for processes of deliberation (Cohen 1989) 
and compromising (Sartori 1987), compared to representative institutions. 
They, thus, endanger the interests of minorities and allow for a more 
unrestricted and immediate implementation of majority interests. They can 
be used by elites to bypass stakeholders and to mobilize individuals for 
personal power gains by means of communication and easy answers to 
difficult problems. This model of a populist democracy is, thus, not able to 
strike a balance between the control of power and participation. It is, thus, of 
a lower quality compared to Dahl’s model of Polyarchy. 
 
The preceeding theoretical analysis suggests in light of Dahl’s model of 
Polyarchy that participatory engineering holds more pitfalls than promises for 
the quality of democracy. I argue in a next step that participatory theory 
provides one ray of hope through introducing a third dimension of 
democracy, namely size. The theory of participatory democracy is, at first, a 
purely normative project which needs to be developed further at the 
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institutional level of analysis. Participatory theory suggests that we can solve 
trade-off problems discussed above by stressing the local level of democracy. 
 
The main focus of participatory theory lies in the critique of the liberal model 
of democracy for its deficits in implementing the value of political 
participation. This critique originated in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the 
midst of a broader cultural quest for more democracy and social equality. 
Participatory theory envisions a more radical implementation of the idea of 
popular sovereignty compared to liberal democracy. Its protagonists claim 
that this vision can be reached by increasing opportunities to participate in 
micro-democratic settings (Pateman 1970; Macpherson 1977; Bachrach and 
Botwinick 1992). According to this perspective, more institutional 
opportunities to participate in micro-democratic settings will have a positive 
effect on political behavior and will result in higher levels of participation. 
The institutional restraints impinging on political participation within the 
frame of liberal democracy were seen, in turn, as the crucial factor lessening 
political engagement and spawning political apathy (Walker 1966). 
 
The model of participatory democracy does not ignore the tension between 
the exercise of popular sovereignty and the control of power. It aims to 
circumvent the dangers of an imbalance between the two basic dimensions of 
democracy by reminding us of a third dimension of democracy, namely space 
or size. Participatory theory suggests that developing local democratic regimes 
go beyond Polyarchy by further maximizing simultaneously public 
sovereignty and the control of power.  
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Figure 5: Local democracy 
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In participatory theory the link between local democratic regimes and macro-
democracy is constructed primarily through the micro level of analysis. Local 
democracy is seen as a school of democracy which could help to turn 
individuals into responsible citizens. A first assumption is that every citizen 
will acquire cognitive and strategic skills through participating at the local 
level. A second crucial assumption stresses that citizens accustomed to 
participating in the local context will acquire a sense of community enabling 
them to act in view of the common good rather than their own self interest 
also at higher levels of politics. If both assumptions hold true, the tension 
between popular sovereignty and the control of power is abrogated through 
the process of self-transformation; both values, thus, can be maximized rather 
than optimized. 
 
Participatory theory is not very explicit with regard to the institutional level 
of analysis which is in the focus of this analysis. The institutional aspect of 
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local democracy implies two questions or two different levels of analysis. The 
first level touches upon the type of institutions defining local regimes of 
democracy. What does a local democratic regime look like in institutional 
terms and which local regime maximizes the exercise of popular sovereignty 
at the local level? The specific institutions of local democracy can be seen as 
mirroring the tool kit that is also available at the national level. The electoral 
regime can be, first and foremost, made more responsive by increasing the 
choices of voters through the introduction of particular electoral mechanisms, 
such as the recall, primaries, personalized voting systems, short election cycles 
and the direct election of all public officials.  
 
The opening up of the local decision making process through local 
referendums and local popular initiatives can be seen as the ultimate and most 
decisive move towards democratization. Because of the small scale of local 
democracy, the deliberation on policy issues can be made more inclusive in 
the context of the electoral regime, as well as in the context of direct 
democracy. The New England Town Meeting is a classical example for 
deliberative direct democracy. In this scheme, the citizens of a community 
discuss the issues to be decided in a community assembly and afterwards vote 
on these issues. 
 
The second institutional problem raised by local democracy concerns the 
mechanisms that tie local democracy back to national democracy. This is 
finally the level which is in the focus of any measure of democratic quality. 
How can we make sense of the institutional linkage between increasing local 
democracy and increasing the overall democratic quality of a given system? 
This question is hardly raised in participatory theory. I can think of two 
plausible lines of arguments with regard to this question. The first line of 
argument suggests decentralization as the magic bullet. This assumes, first and 
foremost, a transfer of competencies from the national to the local level. This 
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would allow individual citizens to actually decide important questions in the 
local context and to, thus, exercise popular sovereignty in a meaningful way. 
In decentralized systems, sovereign citizens would take a large portion of 
crucial decisions in their local context. 
 
Not all competencies in a state can be decentralized. Some competencies 
have to remain at the higher levels of government, which asks for a multilevel 
system of democracy. Multilevel democracy could be linked in this case via 
different means of local interest aggregation. I can think of three mechanisms, 
which could be conductive in this context. Local democracies could, firstly, 
be aggregated via new representative bodies, such as parliaments of regions or 
localities. Local democracies could, secondly, be aggregated via changing 
forms of representation within established representative institutions. In this 
case, the primary focus of representation would shift from parties to localities. 
Local democracies could, thirdly, voice their concerns at the local level via 
associations that would lobby national political institutions. This would result 
in a new system of intergovernmental bargaining and decision making. 
 
Why does local democracy keep the promises of participatory engineering 
while avoiding the pitfalls? Local democracy, if combined with decentralized 
governance and institutions to effectively aggregate local interests to the 
national level, on the one hand increases public sovereignty. More citizens 
are able to influence more decisions in a more direct way. On the other 
hand, this shift along the first dimension of democracy does not imply any 
negative impact along the second dimension of democracy. Moreover, it has 
a positive impact on a system’s ability for the control of political power. The 
decentralization of government provides a safety valve against any 
infringements on individual rights and the misuse of power. The violation of 
rights would concern only a small part of the citizens, rather than the whole 
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citizenry as such. Decentralization also increases pluralism within a system. 
The competition between local democracies would, thus, make such 
violations transparent and would eventually stop the affected community 
from continuing any kind of policy violating individual rights or the pluralist 
process as such. The violation of the rights of a small  part of citizens would, 
therefore, only be of a temporary nature. 
 
The analytical framework presented in the preceding remarks can be used to 
empirically evaluate the actual effect of participatory engineering on the 
quality of democracy within established democracies. This will be the task of 
the next section. This section does not aim to be broad, comprehensive and 
quantitative. It should rather be perceived as a cursory overview to 1) test for 
the existence of reforms moving into the direction of local democracy; to 2) 
further specify particular reform measures that fall into this category; and to 3) 
explore the similarities and differences between national approaches in this 
regard. This section will focus, for this very purpose, on three established 
democracies in Western Europe that differ quite significantly in their 
institutional designs: Germany, the UK, and Sweden. 
Participatory engineering in European democracies 
The Swedish government established a commission on democracy in 1997, 
which debated institutional reforms to increase political participation. It 
submitted a report in 2000, which put a special emphasis on suggestions to 
strengthen the local basis of democracy. Two years later, in 2002, the 
government proposed an official democracy policy to the Swedish 
Parliament. This government bill mainly focused on increasing the 
responsiveness of representative institutions at the local level. It suggested, 
among others, granting ordinary citizens the right to place items on the municipal 
assembly agenda and to be appointed onto standing committees in the assembly. The 
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bill also suggested establishing youth advisory boards, as well as citizen panels to 
aid the municipal assembly in legislative matters (Jarl 2005). 
 
The Swedish government bill “Democracy for the New Century” was 
nothing more than a suggestion to the Swedish municipalities. It was neither 
legally binding, nor did it contain negative or positive incentives to affect 
institutional policies at the local level. This resulted in a lukewarm reaction 
on the part of the Swedish municipalities. According to Montin (2007), only 
10 out of 290 municipalities implemented a larger number of the measures 
proposed in the government bill in the context of an overall comprehensive 
reform strategy. A larger number of communities implemented single 
measures, such as opening up the municipal assembly agenda to citizen 
proposals (50%) or introducing different kinds of citizen panels (20%). The 
Swedish government bill “Democracy for the New Century”, thus, brought 
a marginal change in the responsiveness of existing representative institutions.  
Erik Amna (2006) pictures the legacy of the Commission on Democracy as 
mostly rhetorical and mainly focused on increasing the quality of 
governmental services at the local level. He stresses that the Commission 
developed bold reform proposals, such as the comprehensive introduction of 
local referenda. But according to this author, the government bill largely 
reiterated the traditional service democracy ideal of Swedish democracy in its 
response to the Commission’s Report. 
 
The German case is defined by three reform strategies towards strengthening 
local democracy. Wollmann (2005) firstly emphasizes the direct election of 
mayors that was legally implemented in all German communities in the 
1990s. This development goes together with the adoption of recall options, 
which allow citizens to unseat mayors. Scarrow (2001), secondly, detects for 
the same time span an expansion in direct democracy at the local level in 
Germany. Kost (2006) stresses that local direct democracy did not exist in 
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Germany before 1990, with the exception of the state of Baden-
Württemberg. Since then all of the remaining 15 states adopted the 
referendum and the initiative as part of their state constitution. This 
constitutional change resulted in the frequent use of direct decision making at 
the local level. Until the end of 2003, approximately 2.700 initiatives and 
almost 1.400 referenda took place in German communities. Bavaria is the 
front-runner with 500 referendums taking place between 1995 and 2000 
(Kost 2006). 
 
A third area of reform concerns the electoral system of the German states. 
Kersting (2007) shows that many German states introduced cumulative voting 
and the panache system during the 1990s, in an attempt to increase 
opportunities for strategic decision making and participation in the act of 
voting. Both versions allow voters to disregard the party list by voting for 
individual candidates. Both systems, however, go beyond the mere 
introduction of personal voting. Cumulative voting includes the possibility to 
give more than one vote for one single candidate. The panache permits the 
distribution of votes over different party lists. This includes the possibility to 
have more than one vote. Mostly, voters have as many votes as there are seats 
in the elected assembly. 
 
The UK is an interesting third case in our cursory survey on participatory 
engineering at the local level. Scarrow (2001) demonstrates that the UK 
actually reduced opportunities for direct decision making at the local level, in 
sharp contrast to the German situation. This took place at the beginning of 
the 1970s when reforms in English local government removed most of the 
rules providing for referenda. The British case is, nevertheless, also 
characterized by the proliferation of participatory measures in local 
government. These measures, however, perceive locals largely as consumers, 
rather than as citizens. The British development is largely defined by the 
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concept of New Public Management (NPM) (Peters 2001: 160f.). This 
concept highlights reform instruments which do not sit well with any 
normative model of democratic quality and which reflect a troublesome 
tendency among decision makers to invent and market new models of 
democracy as they see fit. 
 
According to Wilson (1999), conservative governments from 1979 onwards 
promoted public involvement in service use. The consumer-oriented notion 
of accountability was exemplified by a Minister for the Public Services at that 
time, who boldly argued that representative democracy via the ballot box was 
not necessarily the best way of securing efficient, accountable and responsive 
public services: the crucial point was ‘not whether those who run our public 
services are elected, but whether they are producer-responsive or consumer 
responsive’ (Wilson 1999: 249). This very idea provides the cornerstone of 
recent New Public Management policies in the UK, designed to approach 
citizens as users and to consult and monitor public services in far reaching 
ways. Pratchett (2002) stresses in this context electronic service delivery, the 
so called Best Value program, introduced by the Local Government Act 
1999, and a large array of consultation mechanisms suggested by various 
Government White Papers such as the Blair Governments White Paper 
Modern Local Government: In Touch with the People (July 1998). 
 
Bonney (2004) points at citizens’ juries as one key element in the British 
consultation policy regime. Such juries enable small numbers of 
representative citizens to engage in in-depth discussion and debate about 
major issues affecting their communities. These bodies function as advisory 
boards to local communities. They are frequently used in the UK but they 
are purely consultative and lack any legal basis. They deliberate only on issues 
suggested by the community and are essentially at its disposal. People’s panels 
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are large-scale representative samples of citizens who subject themselves to 
the regular evaluation of local authorities services and policies. They again are 
used on a consultative ad-hoc basis, lacking a legal and secure basis. 
Does participatory engineering improve the quality 
of democracy? 
The previous case studies suggest that decision makers in European 
democracies are moving into the right direction in the course of participatory 
engineering. This is because of the strong focus of their activities on local 
democracy. The previous report on the literature on democratic reform for 
three countries highlighted a number of specific reform policies focusing on 
the local level. The previous survey, however, also stresses strikingly different 
approaches towards local democracy. The German approach towards local 
democracy appears to be most far reaching compared to the Swedish and the 
British approach. While Germany emphasizes direct decision making, 
changes in electoral laws, and the introduction of direct decision making, 
Swedish authorities implement only marginal changes in the communities’ 
representative structures. British policy makers, in turn, emphasize New 
Public Management initiatives which are hardly related to the notion of 
democracy at all. 
 
These findings raise three crucial questions for further research. They, firstly, 
suggest a more comprehensive comparative analysis on local democracy 
which would cover a greater number of cases. The crucial question here is 
whether the German case can be considered an outlier in the European 
context or whether the three cases represent three equally salient reform 
strategies among European governments. A second question concerns the 
politics of participatory engineering which could provide explanations for the 
observed differences between European nation states. How can we explain 
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the quite far reaching developments in Germany compared to the more 
hesitant approaches in Sweden and the UK?  
 
A third question concerns the vertical dimension of local democracy, that is 
the institutional linkage between local and national democracies. The 
literature on democratic reform hardly touches upon this subject. It is largely 
silent on the question how democratization at the local level can be linked 
with democratic decision making at the systemic level and notions of 
democratic quality. This is an important issue in the context of the question 
raised in this analysis. If communities have few competencies and are only 
loosely aligned with the national level, participation at the local level is hardly 
meaningful in terms of enhancing the quality of democracy as such. 
 
I shall conclude this analysis by pointing to a third perspective on 
participatory engineering, which shows a significant overlap with the 
framework developed in the previous remarks but which, nevertheless, needs 
to be kept distinct from it. This perspective emphasizes the European level 
and the problem of a European transnational democracy. Beate Kohler-Koch 
(2004) has emphasized earlier that European policy makers, especially the 
European Commission, are quite active in terms of participatory engineering, 
too. At the European level, a fair amount of attention is given to the goal of 
“bringing the citizens in” by means of institutional reforms. 
 
Dahl’s model of Polyarchy can be quite useful for evaluating and discussing 
the efforts to further develop a European transnational democracy. I believe 
that it conveys three important messages to European policy makers in this 
regard that I shall conclude with. Firstly, it suggests not to develop 
expectations for a European democracy, which cannot even be met at the 
national level. Dahl’s model of Polyarchy, secondly, suggests that the 
combination of federal structures and democracy, maybe in a new and 
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innovative way, should be in the focus of European constitution making 
(Kielmansegg 1996). Dahl, thirdly, suggests to be more cautious about 
constitutionalism as a means of controlling political power and to rely more 
on political pluralism. This is an argument which should be taken seriously 
given Dahl’s own life experiences with a compound republic that has 
managed to survive more than 200 years so far. 
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